There has been some discussion in other threads (such as “Non-Violent War”) touching on the subject of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), a relatively recent concept in military philosophy. As an officer in the United States Navy, I find the topic very intriguing and most apropos in light of modern warfare trends since World War II.
Below is a summary of the first three modern warfare generations with a brief description (from The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation; Nightengale, Schmitt, Sutton, and Wilson; Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989.):
First Generation Warfare (1GW): “First generation warfare reflects tactics of the era of the smoothbore musket, the tactics of line and column.”
Second Generation Warfare (2GW): “Second generation warfare was a response to the rifled musket, breechloaders, barbed wire, the machinegun, and indirect fire. Tactics were based on fire and movement, and they remained essentially linear. The defense still attempted to prevent all penetrations, and in the attack a laterally dispersed line advanced by rushes in small groups.”
Third Generation Warfare (3GW): “Third generation warfare was also a response to the increase in battlefield firepower. However, the driving force was primarily ideas. Aware they could not prevail in a contest of materiel because of their weaker industrial base in World War I, the Germans developed radically new tactics. Based on maneuver rather than attrition, third generation tactics were the first truly nonlinear tactics.”
What is the fourth? The writers of the above article in 1989 envisioned a new philosophy based on either developing technology (the traditional train of thought in most halls in the Pentagon, I’d argue), or one based on ideas. The latter has gained greater acceptance in recent years because of terrorist activity and other sub-national organizations, especially in light of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and thus will be the definition of 4GW that I use henceforward in this post.
Unlike previous generations where the primary objective was to destroy enemy forces in the field (1GW and 2GW) or to defeat the enemy’s command and control capabilities (3GW), 4GW aims to defeat the will of the enemy to fight. (Ho Chi-Minh’s defeat of France and later the United States is an example of this.) Concepts such as terrorism, guerilla warfare, assassinations, public relations/propaganda, and even supporting local inhabitants by providing for them and protecting them are all arguably part of the 4GW concept.
I personally believe that 4GW will never fully eclipse Third Generation Warfare, the style of which the United States has dominated since the end of World War II. However, I do think it will grow in usage in a world no longer polarized by the Cold War.
Some think it may even portend the demise of super powers or even the nation-state. I do not, however.
I am opening this thread to discuss the implications of these ideas and the philosophies of warfare.
Three opening questions (feel free to answer or bring up other thoughts):
1. Do you believe terrorism and sub-national entities like Al-Qaeda to be the center-piece of 4GW? If not, what do you see as the next warfare generation?
2. Assuming that terrorism and sub-national entities comprise the center of 4GW, how should nations like the United States, Britain, or even the fledgling government of Iraq fight a 4GW conflict?
3. The only conflicts ever lost by the United States were 4GW in nature (Vietnam, Lebanon 1982, and Somalia). Likewise the USSR also lost a 4GW war (Afghanistan). France (Vietnam) and arguably most recently Spain (when the terror attacks on the train station influenced Spanish elections and lead to a change in national policy favorable to Al-Qaeda) did as well. Can nations defeat a 4GW enemy?
For further reading I’ve provided a couple of initial links. (As everyone knows though, any Google search will turn up a plethora of information.) If you have not already, I also recommend reading “The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century” by Col. Thomas X. Hammes, USMC.
”The Changing Face of War”
Fourth Generation Warfare Theory
Respectfully,
M
Below is a summary of the first three modern warfare generations with a brief description (from The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation; Nightengale, Schmitt, Sutton, and Wilson; Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989.):
First Generation Warfare (1GW): “First generation warfare reflects tactics of the era of the smoothbore musket, the tactics of line and column.”
Second Generation Warfare (2GW): “Second generation warfare was a response to the rifled musket, breechloaders, barbed wire, the machinegun, and indirect fire. Tactics were based on fire and movement, and they remained essentially linear. The defense still attempted to prevent all penetrations, and in the attack a laterally dispersed line advanced by rushes in small groups.”
Third Generation Warfare (3GW): “Third generation warfare was also a response to the increase in battlefield firepower. However, the driving force was primarily ideas. Aware they could not prevail in a contest of materiel because of their weaker industrial base in World War I, the Germans developed radically new tactics. Based on maneuver rather than attrition, third generation tactics were the first truly nonlinear tactics.”
What is the fourth? The writers of the above article in 1989 envisioned a new philosophy based on either developing technology (the traditional train of thought in most halls in the Pentagon, I’d argue), or one based on ideas. The latter has gained greater acceptance in recent years because of terrorist activity and other sub-national organizations, especially in light of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and thus will be the definition of 4GW that I use henceforward in this post.
Unlike previous generations where the primary objective was to destroy enemy forces in the field (1GW and 2GW) or to defeat the enemy’s command and control capabilities (3GW), 4GW aims to defeat the will of the enemy to fight. (Ho Chi-Minh’s defeat of France and later the United States is an example of this.) Concepts such as terrorism, guerilla warfare, assassinations, public relations/propaganda, and even supporting local inhabitants by providing for them and protecting them are all arguably part of the 4GW concept.
I personally believe that 4GW will never fully eclipse Third Generation Warfare, the style of which the United States has dominated since the end of World War II. However, I do think it will grow in usage in a world no longer polarized by the Cold War.
Some think it may even portend the demise of super powers or even the nation-state. I do not, however.
I am opening this thread to discuss the implications of these ideas and the philosophies of warfare.
Three opening questions (feel free to answer or bring up other thoughts):
1. Do you believe terrorism and sub-national entities like Al-Qaeda to be the center-piece of 4GW? If not, what do you see as the next warfare generation?
2. Assuming that terrorism and sub-national entities comprise the center of 4GW, how should nations like the United States, Britain, or even the fledgling government of Iraq fight a 4GW conflict?
3. The only conflicts ever lost by the United States were 4GW in nature (Vietnam, Lebanon 1982, and Somalia). Likewise the USSR also lost a 4GW war (Afghanistan). France (Vietnam) and arguably most recently Spain (when the terror attacks on the train station influenced Spanish elections and lead to a change in national policy favorable to Al-Qaeda) did as well. Can nations defeat a 4GW enemy?
For further reading I’ve provided a couple of initial links. (As everyone knows though, any Google search will turn up a plethora of information.) If you have not already, I also recommend reading “The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century” by Col. Thomas X. Hammes, USMC.
”The Changing Face of War”
Fourth Generation Warfare Theory
Respectfully,
M
