http://www.proofthatgodexists.org/
I just want peoples views on this website and its aims (are they succesful), its actually pretty good.
especially INDI - please quote me once i love you.....i really do....and pie It is not at all good. It simply sets up a false dichotomy...
I clicked "I don't care if absolute truth exists" and then the Disney website came up. 
| Bikerman wrote: |
| It is not at all good. It simply sets up a false dichotomy... |
eleborate great master of Biker man (related too biker mice from mars)Abolute truth. Chose no and you get the 'absolutely true' or 'false' choice. False dichotomy. If absolute truth does not exist then clearly no answer of 'absolutely true' is acceptible, but the game is that this is 'truth' within a constrained set of parameters - we can call them axioms. Within a closed system of axioms then 'absolute truth' is indeed possible. The original question, however, did not qualify what it meant by 'absolute truth'. It is perfectly consistent to believe that absolute truth does not exist, but that 'proofs' or 'truths' are possible within a constrained set of axioms.
I went ahead and clicked "I believe there is an absolute truth" and answered the next questions honestly. I got stuck in Step Six: The Nature of Laws (b) because I do not believe morality is absolute/universal.
EDIT: hmmmm...
| Quote: |
| The Proof that God exists is that without Him you couldn't prove anything. |
...I remain unconvinced. | Bikerman wrote: |
| Abolute truth. Chose no and you get the 'absolutely true' or 'false' choice. False dichotomy. If absolute truth does not exist then clearly no answer of 'absolutely true' is acceptible, but the game is that this is 'truth' within a constrained set of parameters - we can call them axioms. Within a closed system of axioms then 'absolute truth' is indeed possible. The original question, however, did not qualify what it meant by 'absolute truth'. It is perfectly consistent to believe that absolute truth does not exist, but that 'proofs' or 'truths' are possible within a constrained set of axioms. |
why did you have too be so smart cant you be a dimwit and just agree and convert
religion is the new hip thing too have.....
If only it were. | Quote: |
| Within a closed system of axioms then 'absolute truth' is indeed possible. The original question, however, did not qualify what it meant by 'absolute truth'. It is perfectly consistent to believe that absolute truth does not exist, but that 'proofs' or 'truths' are possible within a constrained set of axioms. |
This.
I obviously missed the bigger picture when I answered the questions, but you're right. There is no absolute truth.
It's funny that the website accidentally showcases the dilemma of "absolute truth" rather than the supposed proof that "God exists". If you really give it much thought, you can't even get through the initial questions unless you lie.Hm, i choose _ truth does absolutely not exist -> then I have to choose that it is absolutely true or not... Well I can't choose absolutely true since it can not be!?!?!?!? How stupid is this???? And not is not correct - just true is correct...
I tried it out, and it seemed to go into the same loop all the time, even when I tried different choices. I don't know what the purpose of it is, looks a bit "silly", or have I missed a deeper meaning somewhere? 
I had another look at this. It actually illustrates the difference between philosophy and theology quite nicely. It is full of fallacious reasoning and 'forced' choices.
The stuff on absolute morality is a classic example. Clearly absolute morality (as defined in this site) does not exist. If you examine the animal kingdom you will see plenty of rape and child molestation.
The question, therefore, is do HUMANS have an absolute morality. So we have immediately set up humans as 'other', which is, of course, the goal. Absolute or 'universal' therefore means, in this case, 'applying to humans'. Even with that qualifier, it doesn't work. At what point in human development did 'rape' become a matter of morality? Do we imagine that our distant ancestors had the same sort (or ANY sort) of morality?
This sort of woolly thinking is a classic example of religious 'argument', as is the attempt to portray anyone who does NOT believe there is an universal morality as a supporter of rape/child molestation.
Third rate thinking, second rate logic and first-rate nonsense.
| Bikerman wrote: |
| The stuff on absolute morality is a classic example. Clearly absolute morality does not exist. If you examine the animal kingdom you will see plenty of rape and child molestation. |
*ahem* "Because it exists naturally, it is not immoral"? ^_^;
| Bikerman wrote: |
| The question, therefore, is do HUMANS have an absolute morality. So we have immediately setup humans as 'other', which is, of course, the goal. Absolute or 'universal' therefore means 'applying to humans'. Even with that qualifier, it doesn't work. At what point in human development did 'rape' become a matter of morality? Do we imagine that our distant ancestors had the same sort (or ANY sort) of morality? |
Because humans didn't always think that rape was immoral, that means that it wasn't always immoral?
Hm... so... because humans didn't always think that the Earth revolves around the sun, that means that it wasn't always revolving around the sun?
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i got a thousand Frih$ to the first person to quote the first sentence in this "proof" where the first fallacy appears, and explain what's wrong with it. ^_^ (Not counting the blurb on the welcome page, just the proof itself, starting from step 1.)
(A bonus 500 Frih$ to the person who spots the secondary sorta-kinda fallacy that appears slightly earlier.)
P.S. i like pie, too. | Indi wrote: |
| Bikerman wrote: | | The stuff on absolute morality is a classic example. Clearly absolute morality does not exist. If you examine the animal kingdom you will see plenty of rape and child molestation. |
*ahem* "Because it exists naturally, it is not immoral"? ^_^; |
No, I'm saying that morality is a human construct, in that without humans the notion doesn't appear to exist. Certainly animals appear to have rules of social conduct - which we could call an ethic/morality I suppose - but those rules are not universal in that different species have different 'normal' behaviours. Thus the notion of 'absolute' morality is fallacious.
| Quote: |
| Hm... so... because humans didn't always think that the Earth revolves around the sun, that means that it wasn't always revolving around the sun? |
Not quite the same. Morality, in this example, is not based on observable and repeatable experiment. It is a social construct and will, therefore, reflect the needs of a particular society. Thus morality is a moving feast, not an absolute.Wasted of my 10 minutes that I spent reading those questions!
That is a terrible argument. When I said I didn't believe that there are universal morality laws it asked me if I personally would find it moral to molest children for fun. I certainly would not but I could see that some culture could find that morally alright. There were so many other fallacies in that argument that its somewhat embarrassing to Christians.
| Magicman wrote: |
| That is a terrible argument. When I said I didn't believe that there are universal morality laws it asked me if I personally would find it moral to molest children for fun. I certainly would not but I could see that some culture could find that morally alright. |
| Quote: |
| ...if I personally would find it moral to molest children for fun. |
I would answer no, but just because it's my opinion doesn't make it universal.
To make things a bit complicated, let's change the example. Let's say abortion, euthanasia, contraception or homosexuality, where morals are a bit confusing. Christians are decided on their stances on those (with the help of the Bible), so guess what they do- they make their stances absolute. So they preach to the ends of the world with no regard for other cultures that may have different stances on the subjects. It's what makes them so annoying in the first place. | tingkagol wrote: |
| To make things a bit complicated, let's change the example. Let's say abortion, euthanasia, contraception or homosexuality, where morals are a bit confusing. Christians are decided on their stances on those (with the help of the Bible), so guess what they do- they make their stances absolute. So they preach to the ends of the world with no regard for other cultures that may have different stances on the subjects. It's what makes them so annoying in the first place. |
Right, the part that gets to me the most however is the "judgment" part of things. I'm not so sure how "christianlike" it is to judge others to that extent. The part that is the problem is the "we know and you don't know" type of nonsense. And judgements like "as a consequence you will certainly be ending up in hell". Which also make christians look bad, and which I genuinely think is not what it is supposed to be about. There has to be compassion, forgiveness, flexibility, love, hope, .... the good stuff. Aiming at "heaven" instead of pointing fingers at "hell". Think there is a saying, be careful what you "wish for", and this "hell" stuff, that we are critical about and through being critical of it, become focussed on, may easily become our own destiny as a consequence. | Bikerman wrote: |
| No, I'm saying that morality is a human construct, in that without humans the notion doesn't appear to exist. |
So non-human intelligent beings can't be moral?
| Bikerman wrote: |
| Certainly animals appear to have rules of social conduct - which we could call an ethic/morality I suppose - but those rules are not universal in that different species have different 'normal' behaviours. Thus the notion of 'absolute' morality is fallacious. |
Ah, so, in two different situations you check the prevailing moral code and see that the two codes are different... therefore there can't be any absolute morality, hm? Well, consider this thought experiment. Suppose i were to measure g here, and get 9.81 ms⁻˛... then go to the Moon and measure it as 1.62 ms⁻˛. Do different observations. Should i then conclude that there is no universal law of gravitation?
And, note, that doesn't even take into account the point that "normal behaviours" doesn't necessarily imply "moral behaviours". That's a variation of the naturalistic fallacy.
And even if a species' normal behaviours were legitimately considerable as moral standards for the species... isn't it still possible to be wrong? After all, in humans, rape was how males and females said "hello" a few hundred thousand years ago... now rape is rather uncommon. So... what happened? Rape is natural for humans, so if someone went on a rape spree would that be moral behaviour now? Or... is it immoral to rape now, and thus, retroactively, also immoral to rape then? Or... is it immoral to rape now but it was moral to ape then... and if so, why and what changed? (Incidentally, this is a hint of why there's something wrong with relative morality, but of course it goes much, much deeper.)
| Bikerman wrote: |
| Not quite the same. Morality, in this example, is not based on observable and repeatable experiment. It is a social construct and will, therefore, reflect the needs of a particular society. Thus morality is a moving feast, not an absolute. |
Mathematics is not based on observable and repeatable experiment either. Tell me what i might observe to prove Euler's identity, for example. Mathematics is based on reason, it is a logical system that follows from a few basic axioms.
So... why isn't morality the same?
Or, look at it another way. You say morality is not based on observable and repeatable experiment, i say neither is gravity. What? you say, Of course gravity is a repeatable observation. No, i say, i measured g differently on Earth and on the Moon, therefore it's not repeatable. Ah, you say, thinking you have me, The value of g may vary, but the law that describes the value of g is universal. To which i reply: Then why can't the same be true for morality; why can't there be a universal law that generates species or cultural variants?
Or to put it another way: the observation that stoning a woman for showing her ankles is ok in Saudi Arabia but not South London doesn't rule out the existence of a universal law any more than the observation that g is ~10 on Earth but not on the Moon would rule out the existence of a universal law of gravitation. You're just looking at the wrong level of abstraction. No one claims that moral codes are absolute or universal (except religious people, of course, but ignore them), just that moral law is universal. Or, put another way: morality is universal... not constant. Just like gravity: it is not constant because it varies, but it varies according to a universal law.
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It seems everyone here is hung up on the notion of universal morality, which is not surprising. Among philosophers no one believes in relative morality, but among everyone else almost everyone does (even many religious people, which is quite bizarre). | Indi wrote: |
| Bikerman wrote: | | No, I'm saying that morality is a human construct, in that without humans the notion doesn't appear to exist. |
So non-human intelligent beings can't be moral? |
That's like saying 'could a non-human intelligent being be funny?'. It only works if you start by assuming that which you are trying to demonstrate - that there is indeed some absolute 'benchmark' by which behaviours can be declared good or bad - moral or immoral (funny or not funny)...
Firstly we need to agree what we mean by 'moral' and 'moral law'. The word is so entwined with religion it is difficult to separate out (which is why I normally prefer 'ethic'). To me, morality is profoundly subjective. I see morals as personal views of right and wrong based on some mix of intelligence, education, experience and biology (and, of course religion).
OK, let's dump the religion bit for now...Morality is then, to me, a personal viewpoint (as opposed to ethics which are imposed or agreed at 'group' levels). A person's 'morals' describes what they, as an individual, 'feel' to be right and wrong.
Now, is this feeling itself (ie some internal 'sense' of right and wrong) universal, in the sense that all intelligent creatures have it? No...we know of members of our own species who have little or no sense of personal morals, so it is entirely plausible to posit an intelligent species with no 'moral inner voice'.
It seems to me that any notion of an absolute moral law presupposes one of two things:
a) That intelligent creatures will naturally converge on a set of behaviours and attitudes which could be called 'moral'. (I'm trying not to fall into the naturalistic fallacy). We know, from direct experience and observation, that people have different moralities - both over geographical and historical spans - no argument there. You contend that it is still possible for there to be some underlying objective benchmark or principle by which personal morality can be objectively tested (or at least I think that's the gist?).
Now, how could we arrive at this universal law?
Option 1 - Given that our 'creatures' under consideration have evolved, and given that they are likely to be 'social' animals (almost certainly if they have 'evolved' extelligence as well as intelligence), then we could predict certain behaviours (reciprocal altruism for example). By the time any species becomes 'intelligent', evolution will have done its thing, and there are likely to be some sorts of common(ish) behaviour similarities across different species of intelligent creature. I wouldn't want to put a label of 'universal' on that, though, and if we are to avoid treating 'moral' and 'normal' as the same then it seems to me that we have to go to option 2.
To me, the notion of universal moral law requires:
Option 2 - Some axioms or premises on which to construct a system of ethics, be it the writings of a prophet, the reported words of a deity, or a rationally and logically argued set of philosophical principles, like equality, autonomy etc. It would probably have to be imposed (given that personal morality seems to be a moving feast if left to itself).
(We see examples of the first two all around us, but I'm guessing that neither of us wishes to go down that line of religious moral absolutism.. )
That leaves us pretty much with moral universalism as I understand it - that is, a universal ethic, or set of ethics, which applies (or should) to "all similarly situated individuals" and is based on rational and logically consistent premises. Now, I could go through Locke's formulation of the universal ethic - variants of which appear in most of the 'moral systems' I can think of - and I could even 'derive' it from the two premises of equality and independence, but I'm sure you could too, so lets take it as a given. As you might know this is actually pretty much my own position with regard to ethics.
HOWEVER
Whilst I think that this works for humans in recent timescales - or at least as well as any other system of morality - I don't think it could truly be 'universal'. Clearly it depends to a large extent on how you define your groupings. The universal ethic is framed in terms of 'people', so there would be nothing inherently 'bad' about harming 'non people'. Some folk try to extend it to cover animals but you then run into the issue that Peter Singer goes on about - defining 'personhood' to include other species in some form. So the only way I can think to apply it to aliens as a truly 'universal' would be to have a definition of 'person' which covers any and every 'intelligence' .. err, I sense problems ahead....
I'm still left thinking that, whilst we humans can arrive at a rational and consistent basis for an ethical code, it is still, inevitably dependant on the choice of original premises, and I'm not convinced that any chosen premises would or could be properly universal - even if we use the term to mean 'applying to all members of this one intelligent species we call homo sapiens', let alone if we try to be 'truly' universal....very, very, very....VERY stupid site
PS - Indi,
I forgot to address your analogy between a universal moral law and the law of universal gravitation.
It doesn't appear to me to be a valid analogy for the following reason:
A scientific hypothesis must be tested and, critically, must be falsifiable.
A moral law is difficult to test and is only falsifiable if you accept another imposition of axioms as your measurement. Thus we could 'test' a moral law using several criteria, but WE would have to specify those criteria in advance. Newton's 'law', on the other hand, can be tested empirically and 'nature' provides the criteria....
| Bikerman wrote: |
| Indi wrote: | | Bikerman wrote: | | No, I'm saying that morality is a human construct, in that without humans the notion doesn't appear to exist. |
So non-human intelligent beings can't be moral? |
That's like saying 'could a non-human intelligent being be funny?'. It only works if you start by assuming that which you are trying to demonstrate - that there is indeed some absolute 'benchmark' by which behaviours can be declared good or bad - moral or immoral (funny or not funny)... |
Which is my assumption. ^_^
And, i can back it up with example, too. Let's pick a utilitarian standard: a motive is moral if it is intended to maximize general happiness and minimize general pain. If a non-human intelligent being acted according to that maxim, couldn't they be acting morally? Is there anything uniquely human about that construct? Without humans, would that standard be unable to exist?
i don't deny that - like "funny" - people's (or culture's) opinions differ on whether something is moral or not. i simply say that some people are wrong... something that you cannot say if you suppose a relative standard. For example, you can't tell a NAMBLA member that they're wrong to have sex with children, you can only tell them that you think it's wrong... to which they can just shrug and say "that's your opinion". Now you're going to say "but it's against the law", to which i'll reply, fine, but being illegal does not make it immoral... if morality really is relative then they really can be acting morally when they bugger young children.
(By the way, that is what that website is getting at when it asks the question that annoyed Magicman, and rightfully so. It was stupidly worded, but it represents a real dilemma for relative moralists. If you do really believe in relative morality, then you must believe that for someone else - not yourself, which the website gets wrong - it can be moral to molest children for fun. You cannot claim that it is absolutely wrong to molest children for fun; only that your opinion (or your culture's opinion) is that it is so.)
| Bikerman wrote: |
Firstly we need to agree what we mean by 'moral' and 'moral law'. The word is so entwined with religion it is difficult to separate out (which is why I normally prefer 'ethic'). To me, morality is profoundly subjective. I see morals as personal views of right and wrong based on some mix of intelligence, education, experience and biology (and, of course religion).
OK, let's dump the religion bit for now...Morality is then, to me, a personal viewpoint (as opposed to ethics which are imposed or agreed at 'group' levels). A person's 'morals' describes what they, as an individual, 'feel' to be right and wrong. |
Alright, let's say that morality is a personal viewpoint. But if that is so, then you surrender all rights to decry immoral behaviour, and have it mean anything more than "this is my entirely subjective opinion". In other words, the 9/11 murders were not really an immoral act - because almost certainly the hijackers thought they were acting morally. You say it's immoral? So what? If i say it's not, my opinion has just as much weight as yours. In fact, your opinion has precisely the same weight as Osama's.
And in fact, this definition of morality completely eliminates entire classes of "wrongs". Take lying for example - except in certain official contexts, lying is not illegal. If it's not immoral, then there's really nothing wrong with lying except that if you do it too often it becomes less effective, which seems to imply that you should lie dilligently when it is maximally advantageous - and not not at all.
| Bikerman wrote: |
| Now, is this feeling itself (ie some internal 'sense' of right and wrong) universal, in the sense that all intelligent creatures have it? No...we know of members of our own species who have little or no sense of personal morals, so it is entirely plausible to posit an intelligent species with no 'moral inner voice'. |
The 'moral inner voice' - or conscience - is simply our rational minds recognizing a discordance between your moral imperatives, and other imperatives (like self-satisfaction). If this is lacking that could either imply a damaged rational faculty, or the lack of moral imperatives. Neither of those imply that morality isn't universal, both are simply signs of damage in some sense. If your rational faculty isn't working properly, you're clearly not running at 100%. And if the lack of a moral sense implies that morality isn't a universal concept, then blindness implies that light isn't a universal concept.
| Bikerman wrote: |
| Whilst I think that this works for humans in recent timescales - or at least as well as any other system of morality - I don't think it could truly be 'universal'. Clearly it depends to a large extent on how you define your groupings. The universal ethic is framed in terms of 'people', so there would be nothing inherently 'bad' about harming 'non people'. Some folk try to extend it to cover animals but you then run into the issue that Peter Singer goes on about - defining 'personhood' to include other species in some form. So the only way I can think to apply it to aliens as a truly 'universal' would be to have a definition of 'person' which covers any and every 'intelligence' .. err, I sense problems ahead.... |
i don't see that there is any issue with defining groups, and i think it is neither necessary nor desirable to define morality (or ethics, if you prefer) in terms of "people" (whether you mean humans by people or not).
Singer's hangup about "people" is more of a legal problem than a moral one (technically, a question about applied ethics, not descriptive ethics, rather like the difference between engineering and science), and previous moral philosophers - going all the way back to Kant, the first real moral philosopher - never really cared about the issue. Take Kant for example - his morality was entirely founded on the notion of "rational agents" and universal maxims... and the "rational agent" part wasn't part of determining what was moral, but who was moral. Utilitarianism doesn't care about "people" at all either, just about maximizing "happiness", which should be definied in terms of whatever or whoever your actions will affect. And so on. Basically, so long as you can feel happiness you can be part of someone's moral equation, and so long as you can recognize the happiness of others and make rational judgments about them you can act (im)morally.
Besides, even if there were issues with categorization, that doesn't imply that morality isn't universal, just that care must be taken determining who it applies to, and how to apply it. It doesn't imply that a universal moral formula can't described in abstract terms (using "moral agent", for example), it simply means that case-by-case application can be tricky (is a person a "moral agent"? probably. is an intelligent computer program? well... a very young child? .... etc.).
| Bikerman wrote: |
| I'm still left thinking that, whilst we humans can arrive at a rational and consistent basis for an ethical code, it is still, inevitably dependant on the choice of original premises, and I'm not convinced that any chosen premises would or could be properly universal - even if we use the term to mean 'applying to all members of this one intelligent species we call homo sapiens', let alone if we try to be 'truly' universal.... |
Well, let me throw this out there. i presume you think that scientific knowledge is 'universal', in that if a completely alien species were to search for natural truth, they would arrive at the same answers (i'm only concerned with correct answers - of course, there is a chance that one or both groups could be wrong about something).
But here's the thing: all scientific knowledge generated depends on the first principles by which it was demonstrated. In the past, we used Baconian methods, today Popper is the primary architect of our scientific first principles. With bad first principles, we generate bad scientific knowledge - look to the past for evidence of that, especially pre-Baconian science like Aristotelean science - even if that scientific knowledge appears internally sound. Suppose we used the kinds of first principles that creationists wanted us to use, for example - we would end up with "science" that satisfies the aim of their first principles, and that is internally consistent within their framework. You simply couldn't say that their "scientific" knowledge is wrong... all you can say is that, using your first principles (which are the first principles science actually uses), it doesn't hold up.
And remember, these are first principles, which means they cannot be proven by that which they are first principles for (this comes from Gödel). Nothing in science - proper or creationist - can prove that the first principles used for that science are wrong. Their first principles are wrong according to your first principles, and vice versa.
But that doesn't mean that their first principles are just as right as your first principles. To make that determination, you have to use an external judgement - for example, you have to use the philosophical study of epistemology to show that the first principles of proper science are right while the first principles of creationist science are wrong.
Now to morality. No matter which moral system you use, you must use some kind of axiomatic first principles - even if your first principle is just that "morality is subjective". You have implied that the choice of first principles is completely arbitrary. i say no more so than the first principles of science, and, like the first principles of science, they can be shown to be good first principles by outside arguments (like other parts of philosophy)... but not within the framework itself.
So while no one can use morality to show which moral first principle is the best, that doesn't make the choice completely arbitrary and meaningless any more that it makes the choice of first principles of science so. As i would do for science's first principles, i can use observation and (non-moral) philosophical arguments to show that your moral first principles - that morality is individually or culturally relative - don't work as well as a universal model would. And if i can do that, then i have shown that morality is universal.
(And by the way, that also answers the PS. Even science is only testable within the axioms you have chosen to use for it. If a creationist "tests" the constancy of the speed of light within their axioms, they won't ever find any contradictions with the fact that the speed of light is increasing (or decreasing, or whatever the nonsense they claim is). If you test the constancy of the speed of light within the regular axioms of modern science, your findings will contradict theirs, but not your own (unless your own finding was wrong within your own scientific axioms). Similarly, if your moral axiom is different from someone else's, all bets are off - you can't use morality itself to justify your moral axioms. You have to justify them externally - which is what makes them first principles.) | Indi wrote: |
| And, i can back it up with example, too. Let's pick a utilitarian standard: a motive is moral if it is intended to maximize general happiness and minimize general pain. If a non-human intelligent being acted according to that maxim, couldn't they be acting morally? Is there anything uniquely human about that construct? Without humans, would that standard be unable to exist? |
Sure, it could exist. So could a competing and different 'law', the more general 'Lockean' version.
1. Acts are good if and only if they are welcomed benefits.
2. Acts are evil if they coercively harm others as invasions.
3. All other acts are neutral.
Now, which 'universal' ethic is right? The utilitarian, or the 'Lockean' universal ethic? The answer is that you pays more money and you takes your choice. Both can be defended depending on the choice of initial premises. Locke starts with two: human beings are all equal, and they are independent.
Utilitarianism starts with Bentham's formulation of 'happiness' which is based on the premise that pleasure and pain are the only 'intrinsic' values.
Both ethics are different, though similar, and both lead to different judgements of the morality of certain actions.
Are both 'universal'? The scientist in me rebels at that.
| Quote: |
| i don't deny that - like "funny" - people's (or culture's) opinions differ on whether something is moral or not. i simply say that some people are wrong... something that you cannot say if you suppose a relative standard. For example, you can't tell a NAMBLA member that they're wrong to have sex with children, you can only tell them that you think it's wrong... to which they can just shrug and say "that's your opinion". Now you're going to say "but it's against the law", to which i'll reply, fine, but being illegal does not make it immoral... if morality really is relative then they really can be acting morally when they bugger young children. |
But I have no particular problem with that. I would say that under my choice of ethical 'viewpoint' the act is clearly coercive harm and therefore immoral. Under utilitarianism it is not so clear cut. If the child were, by being buggered by many people, bringing 'happiness' to a large number, then would not the pain of the one be outweighed by the 'happiness' of the many? Now, OK, Mill's later 'reformulation' discriminates between happiness and pleasure and says that happiness follows from virtue rather than sating desire - but that is, to me, a 'patch'.
| Quote: |
| (By the way, that is what that website is getting at when it asks the question that annoyed Magicman, and rightfully so. It was stupidly worded, but it represents a real dilemma for relative moralists. If you do really believe in relative morality, then you must believe that for someone else - not yourself, which the website gets wrong - it can be moral to molest children for fun. You cannot claim that it is absolutely wrong to molest children for fun; only that your opinion (or your culture's opinion) is that it is so.) |
Well, in my system of ethics it is clearly immoral, but there are also problems with the universal ethic. My point is that I don't think there IS a universal morality to be 'discovered' - whereas there are different moralities which can be imposed. In this specific instance I would have no problem in telling the paedophile that, yes, you might be able to justify your actions, and you might be correct in saying that it cannot be shown to be 'absolutely' wrong, but society has deemed it so, so tough-luck mate.
| Quote: |
| Alright, let's say that morality is a personal viewpoint. But if that is so, then you surrender all rights to decry immoral behaviour, and have it mean anything more than "this is my entirely subjective opinion". In other words, the 9/11 murders were not really an immoral act - because almost certainly the hijackers thought they were acting morally. You say it's immoral? So what? If i say it's not, my opinion has just as much weight as yours. In fact, your opinion has precisely the same weight as Osama's. |
No. The collective opinion is what matters. In this case we have a collective 'opinion' that the 9/11 murders were immoral. People arrive at that from many different ethical systems. I arrive at it via the universal ethic. You could arrive at it from a utilitarian ethic and you could easily arrive at it from an absolutist religious ethic.
| Quote: |
| And in fact, this definition of morality completely eliminates entire classes of "wrongs". Take lying for example - except in certain official contexts, lying is not illegal. If it's not immoral, then there's really nothing wrong with lying except that if you do it too often it becomes less effective, which seems to imply that you should lie dilligently when it is maximally advantageous - and not not at all. |
Well, even under a 'universal' ethic lying is a 'fringe' case. If a lie does not coercively harm others then even under my ethic it is amoral...
| Quote: |
| The 'moral inner voice' - or conscience - is simply our rational minds recognizing a discordance between your moral imperatives, and other imperatives (like self-satisfaction). If this is lacking that could either imply a damaged rational faculty, or the lack of moral imperatives. Neither of those imply that morality isn't universal, both are simply signs of damage in some sense. If your rational faculty isn't working properly, you're clearly not running at 100%. And if the lack of a moral sense implies that morality isn't a universal concept, then blindness implies that light isn't a universal concept. |
What you say is true. My point is that the fact that psychopaths can, and do, function in our society is an indication (nothing stronger) that a society of psychopaths could evolve and exist in which there was no 'universal' moral law as we would recognise it...
| Quote: |
Well, let me throw this out there. i presume you think that scientific knowledge is 'universal', in that if a completely alien species were to search for natural truth, they would arrive at the same answers (i'm only concerned with correct answers - of course, there is a chance that one or both groups could be wrong about something).
But here's the thing: all scientific knowledge generated depends on the first principles by which it was demonstrated. In the past, we used Baconian methods, today Popper is the primary architect of our scientific first principles. With bad first principles, we generate bad scientific knowledge - look to the past for evidence of that, especially pre-Baconian science like Aristotelean science - even if that scientific knowledge appears internally sound. Suppose we used the kinds of first principles that creationists wanted us to use, for example - we would end up with "science" that satisfies the aim of their first principles, and that is internally consistent within their framework. You simply couldn't say that their "scientific" knowledge is wrong... all you can say is that, using your first principles (which are the first principles science actually uses), it doesn't hold up.
And remember, these are first principles, which means they cannot be proven by that which they are first principles for (this comes from Gödel). Nothing in science - proper or creationist - can prove that the first principles used for that science are wrong. Their first principles are wrong according to your first principles, and vice versa.
But that doesn't mean that their first principles are just as right as your first principles. To make that determination, you have to use an external judgement - for example, you have to use the philosophical study of epistemology to show that the first principles of proper science are right while the first principles of creationist science are wrong. |
If the axioms lead to a contradiction between permissible theory and observation then they are wrong. The axioms of creationism inevitably lead to such conflict.
| Quote: |
| Now to morality. No matter which moral system you use, you must use some kind of axiomatic first principles - even if your first principle is just that "morality is subjective". You have implied that the choice of first principles is completely arbitrary. i say no more so than the first principles of science, and, like the first principles of science, they can be shown to be good first principles by outside arguments (like other parts of philosophy)... but not within the framework itself. |
No I disagree. I need more time, however, to frame a coherent response to this. I've got tons of 'prep' to do for an upcoming inspection, so I'll have to take a rain-check for the moment and return to this when I can devote the time it properly requires..... | Bikerman wrote: |
| Are both 'universal'? The scientist in me rebels at that. |
No, unless they are tautologically identical, then only one, maximum, is universal. The fact that we do not yet know which does not make this any harder to believe, i would think. After all, relativity and QM are both claims to be universal theories, yet they contradict. Do you find it hard to believe that there is a theory of physics that applies universally because of that? i don't. One or both is wrong, and the fact that we don't know which doesn't make the possibility of a universal theory any less likely.
| Bikerman wrote: |
| Quote: | | i don't deny that - like "funny" - people's (or culture's) opinions differ on whether something is moral or not. i simply say that some people are wrong... something that you cannot say if you suppose a relative standard. For example, you can't tell a NAMBLA member that they're wrong to have sex with children, you can only tell them that you think it's wrong... to which they can just shrug and say "that's your opinion". Now you're going to say "but it's against the law", to which i'll reply, fine, but being illegal does not make it immoral... if morality really is relative then they really can be acting morally when they bugger young children. |
But I have no particular problem with that. I would say that under my choice of ethical 'viewpoint' the act is clearly coercive harm and therefore immoral. |
Hm, is that so? i'll come back to this.
| Bikerman wrote: |
| Under utilitarianism it is not so clear cut. If the child were, by being buggered by many people, bringing 'happiness' to a large number, then would not the pain of the one be outweighed by the 'happiness' of the many? Now, OK, Mill's later 'reformulation' discriminates between happiness and pleasure and says that happiness follows from virtue rather than sating desire - but that is, to me, a 'patch'. |
Well, several points. First, Mill's "reformulation" of Bentham wasn't a "patch" as much as it was a "refinement". He didn't change or add anything, he just expressed the same idea in different terms (and far more comprehensive ones than Bentham)
Your description of happiness following from from virtue rather than sating desire is wrong. Mill just clarified "happiness" to show that acting virtuously is naturally included. In Mill's view, acting virtuously satisfies the desire you have to act virtuously - you act virtuously because it's a pleasure to do so. In his words: | Utilitarianism, J. S. Mill (Chapter 4) wrote: |
| Those who desire virtue for its own sake desire it either because the consciousness of it is a pleasure, or because the consciousness of being without it is a pain.... |
You see? Mill changes nothing. It's all pleasure/pain. All he did was make the notion of pleasure more sophisticated, so that things that you don't normally associate with simple pleasure are shown to be so associated.
Besides, even if Mill had appended a new axiom to Bentham's utilitarianism... so what? The axioms of science has also has axioms appended - falsifiability being the most recent addition. That doesn't make nature (what science is attempting to describe) any less universal.
But the most troubling this is your application of utilitarianism in the example. i'm not a utilitarian - i find it indefensible - but i do know how rule utilitarians think (and Mill was most likely a rule utilitarian, although the distinction was not made until much later). First of all, morality is applied individually, not by a herd as one. Each person in that rape posse would have to justify the buggering themselves; the herd of buggerers doesn't justify it en masse. Each person would have to ask, "does my short-term happiness at enjoying the rape outweigh the long-term pain and suffering the victim will feel?" or (in more Mill-like terms), "does it increase the general happiness of society if i (not the herd) bugger this child?" Clearly not (you'd have to ask someone else how an act utilitarian model - like what Peter Singer supports - handles this case, i don't really know). You can justify harming someone with utilitarianism, like, "does it increase the general happiness of society if i shoot this terrorist before he hurts his hostages?" but clearly not in the case of the child.
| Bikerman wrote: |
| Well, in my system of ethics it is clearly immoral, but there are also problems with the universal ethic. My point is that I don't think there IS a universal morality to be 'discovered' - whereas there are different moralities which can be imposed. In this specific instance I would have no problem in telling the paedophile that, yes, you might be able to justify your actions, and you might be correct in saying that it cannot be shown to be 'absolutely' wrong, but society has deemed it so, so tough-luck mate. |
Oh? Let's see how well you really believe that.
Correct me if i'm wrong, but you are an atheist, yes? You must recognize that in many Western societies - very probably your own, but certainly the US - the majority holds that it is "immoral" to be an atheist. So, to use your terms, anyone in society can tell you that you are an immoral person for being an atheist, and while you might be able to justify your atheism, and that it is not "absolutely" wrong to be an atheist, society has deemed you immoral, so tough luck. Therefore, in your society, through no fault of your own - you did nothing to harm anyone - you are now immoral.
Ah, but this is just the tip of the iceberg. You see, provided that society holds that pederasty and atheism are both immoral, you must accept that you - as an atheist - are morally equivalent to a child-rapist in the eyes of society. You may be OK with that; you may not care about the opinions of society about your beliefs, but...
If society considers both you - an atheist - and a child rapist immoral, then you both justly deserve punishment, don't you? Well, if you don't agree it doesn't really matter - society would just outvote you, regardless of your argument. In fact if society deems it that atheists deserve the death penalty (which has happened, of course), then while you personally may feel that that's wrong... hey, society says you die so tough luck. And there's nothing wrong with that.
It would mean that if your society chose to execute you for... whatever, it could be as arbitrary as wearing your socks rolled down, because in a relativist morality, whatever people say is (im)moral, is (you have no right to say it's not)... if your society chose to execute you for wearing your socks rolled down, because they feel it is immoral to have rolled-down socks, they are not doing anything wrong, they are merely doing something you personally disagree with.
i don't think you really believe any of those things. i think you recognize that there is some kind of objective difference between calling child abuse immoral and calling atheism immoral. i don't doubt for even a moment that you believe that there is a vast difference between differing opinions and differing moral codes - in that if society says the Jonas Brothers are the greatest band that ever existed and you don't that's no problem, but if society says that homosexuals should be burned alive but you disagree that would be a problem (and no, it's not simply a question of coercive harm, because if society refuses to agree that some band you admire is great they ruin that band's career and put them out of work, leaving them hardship and potential starvation, whereas if society opts to jail homosexuals in comparable comfort (to the starving band), you would not consider the band issue more serious than the homosexual one). And i think you are well aware that everyone recognizes this, even if they can't articulate why. i think you believe, as i do, that even those boneheads who claim that atheism is morally equivalent to child abuse are just blustering for effect, and don't really believe it; they're saying it for the shock value because they know it's universally shocking, because they recognize that it will strike everyone, universally, as... out of sorts somehow.
In fact, i think you do believe there are universals in morality. For example, i think that you would agree that justice requires fairness - if a system is unfair it can't be a just system. i think if someone tried to claim that punishing two identical people who had committed the identical crime under identical circumstances were just, you would say no way. But... you can't. Because if there is no universal standard for determining "right" from "wrong", you can't say that someone else's claim that an unfair system is "right" can stand.
| Bikerman wrote: |
| Quote: | | Alright, let's say that morality is a personal viewpoint. But if that is so, then you surrender all rights to decry immoral behaviour, and have it mean anything more than "this is my entirely subjective opinion". In other words, the 9/11 murders were not really an immoral act - because almost certainly the hijackers thought they were acting morally. You say it's immoral? So what? If i say it's not, my opinion has just as much weight as yours. In fact, your opinion has precisely the same weight as Osama's. |
No. The collective opinion is what matters. In this case we have a collective 'opinion' that the 9/11 murders were immoral. People arrive at that from many different ethical systems. I arrive at it via the universal ethic. You could arrive at it from a utilitarian ethic and you could easily arrive at it from an absolutist religious ethic. |
No? You never answered my charge. i am aware that people can arrive at the same answer as you (that 9/11 was wrong) using different ethics. So what? That doesn't imply they're all good methods any more than solving 16 over 64 by cancelling the 6s proves that method is good. But in point of fact, people can also arrive at the opposite answer - that 9/11 was right. Your society's collective opinion says wrong, Osama's says right. Therefore, in Afghanistan it was right to do 9/11 (and, logically, they should continue to do such things, if possible).
You have no right to say you're right and Osama's wrong. You have surrendered that right by making morality relative. You (or your culture) may disagree with him (or his culture), but you can't expect him to take your opinion any more seriously than you would take his.
Do you see where this leads? If his culture says 9/11 was morally right - or even morally imperative! - then they have no reason not to do it again. And again, and again. You can't tell them they're wrong. You can plead with them to change their opinion, or you can use force, but you can't judge them. All you can do is shrug, accept that your opinions differ, and they get ready for the next attack... or go on the offensive to kill him first.
| Bikerman wrote: |
| Well, even under a 'universal' ethic lying is a 'fringe' case. If a lie does not coercively harm others then even under my ethic it is amoral... |
? Well, that would depend on which universal ethic you use. Not all of them are consequentialist. Most have lying as a rather fundamental sin. Even the childish "do not do to others what you would not want done to yourself" handles lying well.
| Bikerman wrote: |
| My point is that the fact that psychopaths can, and do, function in our society is an indication (nothing stronger) that a society of psychopaths could evolve and exist in which there was no 'universal' moral law as we would recognise it... |
That... doesn't follow. First, the argument uses a fallacy of generalization. Quadraplegics can, and do, function in our society... but a society of quadraplegics wouldn't last too long.
Second, the argument ignores the fact that psychopaths can only function in our society when they don't act like psychopaths. When they are giving into their psychopathic tendencies, they are most certainly not functioning in society, and will, in short order, end up ostracized or imprisoned.
There is no way a society made up of all, mostly or even a significant percentage of psychopaths could exist for an extended period of time, and certainly no way it could thrive.
But i'm mostly confused about what the point you were trying to make is. You seem to have presupposed what shape a universal ethic would take. Who's to say that a universal ethic would be required by a stable society? Even if it were possible to create a functioning society of people who had no conscience, and no notion of morality at all... so what? It is obviously possible to create a society of people who are completely indifferent to magnetic fields (us ^_^) without disproving that magnetic fields exist objectively.
Our society happens to be made up of being with sensitivity to morality, but i don't see that as a requirement for a stable society. And who's to say our sense of it is accurate? Maybe we "feel" morality "wrong", in that our consciences are naturally misattuned. That doesn't disprove a universal morality.
| Bikerman wrote: |
| If the axioms lead to a contradiction between permissible theory and observation then they are wrong. The axioms of creationism inevitably lead to such conflict. |
Ah-ah! You're using your axiom to judge creationism's axioms, and finding them lacking. So what? They can use their axiom to judge yours and find it lacking (and they do).
Your axiom is that theory must agree with observation. Their axiom is that observation must agree with theory. If they find a 60 million year-old fossil, then either the dating is wrong (maybe the radioactive half-lives changed since the Fall or some nonsense like that) or the Devil put the fossil there. You see? If you assume their first principles, you can never disprove their first principles using their science. Likewise, if you use you your first principles, you cannot disprove your first principles using your science. In their world: if the observations disagree with (divine) theory, the observations must be "corrected". In your world: if the theory disagrees with observation, the theory must be fixed. Within the respective frameworks, neither system is preferable, or more right.
It is only when you step back and use another framework that you find the flaw in creation science.
It's the same deal in moral philosophy. Each ethic has its own axioms that it uses to explain morality, and there's no way to tell from the explanations that they generate which ethic is more right. When a given ethic says X is morally wrong, but another ethic says it's right, which ethic is correct? There is no way to tell.
It is only when you step back and use another framework that you can begin to study which ethic may be superior. And that is the way we can tell there is something wrong with one or the other.This debate deserves better input from me - up to now it has been sloppily worded and in places ill considered.
I propose a temporary hiatus whilst I get myself clear of outstanding work and then I'll come back to it next week and, hopefully, make a more coherent argument....
will anyone ever defeat indi....
ps - the laws of logic, science etc are just models we base our day too day lives on so that we can get on with our lives, they can change the only reason they don't is because we haven't found anything that is better
but indi about morality wouldn't you say plain killing is wrong and universal, no culture or creature has ever just killed for the sake of killing....some killed for their gods, some got excited and it fuels them like a drug, some for territory but no culture has ever said killing for no reason is ok...there is always a reason behind thing we call murder but the act of murder without intent is universally wrong
or is it
| Bikerman wrote: |
This debate deserves better input from me - up to now it has been sloppily worded and in places ill considered.
I propose a temporary hiatus whilst I get myself clear of outstanding work and then I'll come back to it next week and, hopefully, make a more coherent argument.... |
It would probably be better to move it to a thread dedicated to the (non)universality of morality. That way we could start out right by a proper definition of terms.
| Bannik wrote: |
| will anyone ever defeat indi.... |
The ninjas stand a chance, if i ever let my guard down....
| Bannik wrote: |
| ps - the laws of logic, science etc are just models we base our day too day lives on so that we can get on with our lives, they can change the only reason they don't is because we haven't found anything that is better |
Yes and no. You have to differentiate between the "laws" we state that describe our understanding, and the real laws that we are trying to discover and describe.
Take gravity for example. The "laws" that we state to describe how we understand gravity have changed a lot over the ages... but has gravity itself changed? No, i think not. Gravity itself is universal - it applies everywhere, all the time - but our understanding of gravity changes. As our science improves, one day our understanding of gravity will match the actual nature of gravity - that will be the day science truly "gets" gravity.
(The same will happen with morality. Our understanding of morality changes over time, but morality itself is universal. As our understanding of morality improves, one day it will eventually match morality itself. But we're a long way off from that.)
| Bannik wrote: |
but indi about morality wouldn't you say plain killing is wrong and universal, no culture or creature has ever just killed for the sake of killing....some killed for their gods, some got excited and it fuels them like a drug, some for territory but no culture has ever said killing for no reason is ok...there is always a reason behind thing we call murder but the act of murder without intent is universally wrong
or is it |
Well... that depends on which theory of morality you believe. Not all of them deal with universal laws of morality, some just suggest universal principles. For example, the one Bikerman was talking about - Millsian utilitarianism - is consequentialist, which means that it would say that killing isn't universally wrong. In Millsian utilitarianism, what is wrong is removing pleasure and causing pain... which killing usually does, yes, but if there was a case where you could kill without removing pleasure and causing pain, there would be nothing wrong with it. The consequences matter, and if there are no bad consequences and only good ones, then sure, kill away.
Personally, i don't buy utilitarianism, though; i think it's a flawed theory. i don't know how popular it is among philosophers nowadays. i think i would be called a neo-Kantian. For a neo-Kantian, killing isn't necessarily wrong either... it depends on why you're killing. Now, you say just plain killing, killing for the sake of killing... well that would certainly be always wrong in neo-Kantian morality, no doubt about it, even if it causes no harm. The justification matters, and since killing someone just for the hell of it violates their humanity (it uses them solely as a means (to your own enjoyment) and not as an end), it is never acceptable.
i think the state of the art in the study of morality is "virtue ethics", which would ask "what virtues/vices are you using when you decide to do this"? In the case of killing for fun, you are certainly not acting virtuously, and you are acting according to a vice (self-enjoyment), so i think it would be ruled wrong.
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Anywho, i'm not going to award the prize for questioning the universality of morality, because it's not a question considered seriously in modern philosophy (and anyway, it had been pointed out long before i made the challenge).First off, sorry, I really didn't read all of this topic.
I personally don't understand the last step: http://www.proofthatgodexists.org/preproof.php
He starts saying:
"To reach this page you had to acknowledge that immaterial, universal, unchanging laws of logic, mathematics, science, and absolute morality exist. Universal, immaterial, unchanging laws are necessary for rational thinking to be possible. Universal, immaterial, unchanging laws cannot be accounted for if the universe was random or only material in nature."
I agree to all of that. There are "immaterial" things which aren't random.
But then he says:
"Only in a universe governed by God can universal, immaterial, unchanging laws exist."
How is that a logical implication? Why can't universal laws exist without God? If he can explain that, it's a real proof. It's like saying: "Apple pie exists. Without God, apple pie couldn't exist. So God exists." It's silly reasoning. | Stubru Freak wrote: |
First off, sorry, I really didn't read all of this topic.
I personally don't understand the last step: http://www.proofthatgodexists.org/preproof.php
He starts saying:
"To reach this page you had to acknowledge that immaterial, universal, unchanging laws of logic, mathematics, science, and absolute morality exist. Universal, immaterial, unchanging laws are necessary for rational thinking to be possible. Universal, immaterial, unchanging laws cannot be accounted for if the universe was random or only material in nature."
I agree to all of that. There are "immaterial" things which aren't random.
But then he says:
"Only in a universe governed by God can universal, immaterial, unchanging laws exist."
How is that a logical implication? Why can't universal laws exist without God? If he can explain that, it's a real proof. It's like saying: "Apple pie exists. Without God, apple pie couldn't exist. So God exists." It's silly reasoning. |
Nailed it.
Yes, the sentence "Only in a universe governed by God can universal, immaterial, unchanging laws exist" is where the "proof" goes borked. There is no logical progression from the previous argument to that line.
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There is a more subtle failure point in the sentence before (ignoring the big block of Bible bullshit in there, of course). i didn't count this because it's really deviously subtle, and easy to miss if you're not being very careful.
Look at this sentence: "Universal, immaterial, unchanging laws cannot be accounted for if the universe was random or only material in nature." That sentence is nonsensical. Why? Look carefully... if "the universe {is} only random" then doesn't that mean that there must be at least one universal law, that law being: "the universe is only random". Isn't that law also immaterial? Isn't that law also unchanging (so long as the nature of the universe remains unchanged)?
In other words, our ambitious friend has managed to shoot himself in the foot. He has carefully drafted an argument that ultimately proves the opposite of his penultimate claim: that universal, immaterial, unchanging laws can exist even in a universe that was purely random... certainly without the need for any gods (which, really, he kind of threw in there out of nowhere).
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Now, there is still another fallacy a little earlier in the "proof" yet to be found. In addition, since i pointed out the subtle fallacy above, yet another fallacy should become noticeable (but this one's also a bit subtle).If you count laws as part of the universe and not something that is just used to describe it, then can any universe really be only material in nature? Any kind of universe would have laws simply by existing and would therefore not be entirely material in nature. That doesn't mean that anything else than the laws needs to be immaterial, though. No need for any God-entity.
Is it really possible with a random universe? In a random universe there would be, as you said, the law that everything is random. Now if that law is unchangeable, is it really random? If the law counts as part of the universe, that universe is not entirely random either.
| catscratches wrote: |
| In a random universe there would be, as you said, the law that everything is random. Now if that law is unchangeable, is it really random? |
? Yes, of course. Why wouldn't it be? The mutability of the law has no relationship to the randomness of what it describes.
If you want a real world example, the location of an electron at any given moment is random. That is an immutable physical law, and it doesn't make the location of the electron any less random.
| catscratches wrote: |
| If the law counts as part of the universe, that universe is not entirely random either. |
If the universe is entirely random, the fact it's entirely random means that it's not entirely random? ^_^;
The problem here is that you're confounding the material universe with the immaterial laws that describe it. The confusion is in the word "part". The laws of the universe are not "part" of the universe in the same way that matter is "part" of the universe. They are "part" of the universe in the same way that your identity is "part" of your physical body, not in the same way that your liver is "part" of your physical body. Your identity arises from your physical body (assuming an entirely material universe), but it is not "part" of it; if you draw a circle around everything that your body is, your identity isn't inside that circle, but nothing else that makes up your identity exists outside of that circle. Similarly, universal, immutable and immaterial laws arise from a completely material (and even completely random) universe, but are not "part" of it.
That's what this proof guy doesn't grok - and not just him, all of the people who can't understand how intelligence or life can arise in an unguided, material universe. This guy's issue is more metaphysical, but it's the same problem. He thinks that it is impossible to have reason/order/etc. in a universe without something to give it these features. But those features spontaneously arise from any system, regardless of the system's characteristics... and even if the system's characteristics contradict the possibility of these features existing... because they're not part of the system.
Where do they exist, then? In our minds. The non-random law that describes a completely random universe does not exist in that universe, it exists in your understanding of that universe, in your mind. Your mind could not exist in a completely random universe (no mind could), so the non-random law that describes a completely random universe can never exist within a completely random universe (so there is no paradox)... but the non-random law that describes a completely random universe will always arise from a completely random universe, even if there are no minds there to understand it. To sum it up: Non-random laws can never have any real existence or representation within a random universe, but will always arise from one; the laws can have a representation in a non-random universe, in the minds of people who understand the laws of a random universe.That was kinda my point. He seems to be going under the belief that laws are part of the universe. Otherwise that "argument" doesn't make any sense whatsoever. (Not that it really does now either...) But if it is, then those universes can't really exist, as I see it, and I have no idéa of what he's talking about when assuming the possibility of them.
If the laws are not part of the universe, however, his argument makes no sense at all.
